Optimal Coverage of Installations in a Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) by Sanderson, Todd et al.
  1
Conference Name: The 51
st Annual Conference of the Australian 




Paper  Title:  Optimal  Coverage  of  Installations  in  a  Carbon 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
 

























   2
Todd Sanderson
*, Tiho Ancev
* and Regina Betz
** 
 





Trading schemes for emission allowances have become a panacea for nations aspiring to 
reduce their aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases from industry in a cost-effective 
manner. The contention of this paper is that an emissions trading scheme (ETS) should 
not be based on blanket coverage of installations on a downstream level, but should rather 
be designed to include some installations, and from some industrial sectors. In the case of 
an ETS there are high costs of administration, monitoring and transacting imposed on the 
installations covered. These costs are supposed to be more than offset by the cost savings 
realised  through  trading  in  the  market  for  emission  allowances.  However,  the  paper 
shows that not all installations can fully offset administrative costs, and are therefore 
exposed  to  higher  cost  compared  to  a  situation  under  an  alternative  instrument  (e.g. 
standard). The paper formulates a conceptual framework for analysing overall cost and 
benefits from an ETS in the light of administration and transactions costs. It theoretically 
establishes a threshold point for optimal coverage of installations on a downstream level. 
The paper uses data from EU ETS to empirically determine optimal coverage for selected 
sectors. The results indicate that blanket coverage is more costly than the determined 
optimum coverage plan.   
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Market-based  instruments  and  emissions  trading  systems  in  particular,  have 
gained  prominence  in  recent  time  as  a  novel  approach  to  reduce  various  types  of 
pollution, including greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These instruments operate on the 
principle that property rights in GHG emissions can be defined and traded in markets. 
Market forces then provide incentives for beneficial trades among participants: emitters 
that can abate at low cost will invest and sell their excess permits, while emitters that 
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have  high  cost  of  abatement  buy  emission  permits.  However,  as  a  designer  market, 
emissions trading systems may suffer from various shortcomings as a result of particular 
design choices being made when setting up the scheme. One design element, which is of 
particular interest of this paper, is the coverage of the scheme (Betz, 2003). When the 
market  for  tradable  emission  allowances  is  designed,  the  question arises  as  to  which 
emitting  entities  are  to  be  included  in  the  system.  Is it  desirable  to  design  a  blanket 
system that includes every emitter of GHG, or should a more pragmatic approach be 
taken by looking at the cost and benefits of inclusion, and designing a system that will 
maximise  the  net  benefits  from  such  an  inclusion?  This  paper  will  focus  on  the 
downstream  coverage,  which  is  the  approach  taken  by  the  EU  ETS.  However,  the 
proposals  made  for  Australia  are  hybrid  combining  an  upstream  and  downstream 
approach
1.  A  preliminary  conceptual  framework  in  the  direction  of  answering  these 
questions, and some preliminary analysis based on data concerning allowance allocation 
from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has been recently put 
forward (Betz and Ancev, 2006).  
The  current  paper  has  two  main  objectives.  One  is  to  refine  and  improve  a 
conceptual framework proposed earlier (Betz and Ancev, 2006) describing the problem 
of optimal inclusion (coverage) of emitting installations in an emission trading system. 
The other is to conduct an empirical analysis of the theoretical proposition for an efficient 
downstream coverage level in an emissions trading system. The  empirical analysis is 
based on installation specific emissions data for 2005 from the EU ETS.    
                                                 
1 A downstream approach requires fossil fuel users to acquire permits compared to an upstream approach 
which requires permits to be acquired by fuel producers. The Australian proposals are described in National 
Emissions Trading Taskforce Report (2006) and Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading 
(2007) report.   4
The key motivation for this research is the fact that GHG emitters in an economy 
form a widely heterogeneous body. On one hand, there are large emitters for which it is 
clearly  beneficial  to  be  included  in  an  ETS.  For  these  emitters  the  fixed  costs  of 
regulation in the system are relatively small compared to the benefits that they can enjoy 
as  a  result  of  being  able  to  trade  emissions  allowances  on  the  market  (Betz,  2005; 
Schleich and Betz, 2004). On the other hand, there are a large number of smaller emitters 
that are likely to be mandated to participate in the ETS. For many of these emitters the 
costs of regulation are very high and there are almost no benefits from being able to 
participate in the system. A previous study (Betz and Ancev, 2006) found that 50% of the 
installations  covered  under  the  EU  ETS,  received  less  than  2%  of  the total  allocated 
emission allowances. This suggests that the costs of operating such a blanket version of 
an emission trading system may be too high in comparison to benefits and that reducing 
the  number  of  covered  emitters,  by  for  example  raising  the  emission  threshold  for 
participation / coverage may in fact produce superior outcomes in terms of the cost for 
the system. While a previous study (Betz and Ancev, 2006) has proposed a theoretical 
model for determining an optimal level of coverage, it fell short of empirically testing the 
model in its entirety because of the lack of actual emissions data. Since such data have 
now become available, the present paper reports an expanded empirical analysis in the 
direction of looking for an efficient level of inclusion of installations in an ETS. 
  This paper focuses on the EU ETS due to data availability and the prominent 
treatment  that  this  tradable  permit  system  has  received  in  the  literature.  European 
Commission (2000) reported that amongst other policies and measures the ETS was the 
preferred instrument for achieving the targeted CO2 reductions, because such an approach   5
can help reduce the cost to the European Community of meeting its commitments under 
the Kyoto protocol.  In  2005 the European Union (EU) initiated the  first phase of an 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) covering some 11,500 emitters and approximately 45% 
of  the  Carbon  Dioxide  (CO2)  emissions  of  the  25  EU  member  states.  This  scheme 
represents the first large scale CO2 emissions trading program, in a region that accounts 
for some 20 percent of global GDP, and around 17 percent of global energy related CO2 
emissions  (Ellerman  and  Buchner  2007).  Directive  2003/87/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament sets out the legal framework for the formation of the EU ETS (European 
Commission 2003). In a recent review of the EU ETS, European Commission (2006a) 
has, among other things, announced an assessment of the situation of smaller emitters. A 
working group has been established with a task to examine the costs and benefits of 
including  small  installations  in  the  EU  ETS  with  the  aim  to  recommend  a  carbon 
emission  threshold  below  which  installations  would  not  be  forced  into  the  ETS,  but 
would  have  a  choice  to  opt-in.  The  Commission  foresees  that  the  emissions  of  the 
installations that choose to stay out of an ETS will be regulated through other policies and 
measures (European Commission, 2006a).  
  Despite the focus on EU ETS, both the theoretical and empirical results reported in 
this paper are of general relevance for carbon emissions trading systems, and can inform 
governments that are currently considering establishing an ETS—such as the Australian 
government—of the tradeoffs involved with the coverage of smaller or larger number of 
emitters in an ETS.  
  The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the refined conceptual model 
of  an  optimal  coverage  of  installations  in  an  ETS  is  outlined.  The  following  section   6
reports the data and methods used to conduct the empirical analysis. The results from the 
empirical analysis together with a discussion are reported in the penultimate section. In 




  The question of coverage of installations in an ETS is conceptualised through the 
perspective  of  a  regulator  whose  objective  is  to  achieve  an  exogenously  set  CO2 
emissions  reduction  target  at  a  minimum  cost.  The  pertinent  assumption  is  that  the 
regulator has only two instruments at their disposal: either to use an emissions standard, 
or to set-up an emissions trading system. This assumption is only needed for the purpose 
of keeping the analysis focused, and can be easily relaxed to include other instruments 
(e.g.  taxes).  In  order  to  determine  the  optimal  level  of  coverage  under  the  ETS,  the 
regulator  has  to  evaluate  the  aggregate  benefits  and  costs  for  both  the  ETS  and  the 
emissions standard. 
Cost of coverage by an ETS 
The cost of participation in an ETS for an individual installation, assuming free initial 
allocation of emissions allowances (i.e. grandfathering)






ij TRC TAC TC + = ,            (1) 
                                                 
2 Convery and Redmond (2007) describe the principal approach to emission allowance allocation in the EU 
ETS as one involving a free or ‘grandfathered’ allocation based on a reduction below the projection of 
business-as-usual emission levels for a given installation during the period covering the first phase of the 
EU ETS.    7
where: 
ETS
ij TC  is the total cost accruing to installation j in industry i from participation in 
the  ETS, 
ETS
ij TAC   is  the  total  abatement  cost  of  the  installation  under  the  ETS,  and 
ETS
ij TRC  is the total cost of administration, monitoring and other regulatory costs. 
  It is possible to further decompose the total cost of abatement into its constituent 
parts: 







ij ij ij ij ij
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ij E E Pe dE E MAC TAC ,      (2) 
where ij MAC  is the marginal abatement cost for installation j in industry i, qij  is  the 
unregulated level of emissions for installation j in industry i, ij E  is the choice of emission 
level for that installation, ij Pe  is the market price of emission allowances faced by that 
installation,
ST
ij E  is the initial allocation of allowances to the installation.  
The  effective  price  of  allowances  faced  by  any  installation  is  the  sum  of  the 
prevailing market price and the cost of transaction to purchase or sell that permit; for 
buyers of allowances transactions cost add to the effective price of allowances, and for 
sellers they detract from the price received
3. This can be expressed by: 
    ij ij t Peq Pe ± = ,              (3) 
where  Peq is prevailing market price for emission allowances, and  ij t  are installation 
specific transactions cost of buying and selling allowances.  
  Additionally, the total regulatory cost (TRC) prevailing under either the ETS or 
the standard can be expressed as the sum of regulatory cost generated at the installation, 
Rij and the costs of oversight and regulation generated by the government regulator which 
                                                 
3 An extended model of transaction costs can be found in Grafton et al (2004), pp. 78-79.    8
are passed onto the installation, GRij. Such that; total regulatory cost under the ETS can 






ij GR R TRC + = ,              (4) 






ij GR R TRC + = ,              (5) 
Cost of coverage by an emission standard 
The cost of compliance for an individual installation covered by an emission standard as 
opposed to being covered with an ETS, and can be expressed as:  






ij TRC TAC TC + = ,            (6) 
where 
ST
ij TAC  is the total abatement cost for installation j in industry i under the standard, 
and 
ST
ij TRC are the costs of administration, monitoring and other costs imposed by the 
regulation. 
  The total abatement cost under the standard can be represented as:  






ij ij ij ij
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where
ST
ij E   is  the  allowable  amount  of  emissions  set  out  by  the  standard,  qij  is  the 
unregulated level of emissions for installation j in industry i,  ij E  is the choice of emission 
level  for  that  installation,  which  is  expected  to  correspond  to 
ST
ij E if  the  standard  is 
binding.    9
Benefits of coverage by an ETS 
The benefits that an individual installation j in industry i derives from being included in 
an ETS, compared to being regulated by a standard, can be represented as the difference 
between the total abatement costs under the standard (equation 5) and the total abatement 
cost under the ETS (equation 2):  






ij TAC TAC B − = ,            (8) 
              
where
ETS
ij B  denotes the benefits from being  covered in an ETS for installation (j) in 
industry  (i).  The  aggregate  social  benefit  of  having  an  ETS  compared  to  having  a 
standard can be expressed as: 
    ∑ ∑
= =














n TAC TAC TAC TAC B
1 1
  ,    (9) 
where
ETS
n B is the aggregation of benefits accruing to the n installations covered by the 
ETS.  As  the  number  of  installations  covered  in  the  ETS  is  varied,  the  value  of  the 
aggregate benefits changes. A concave benefit function whose argument is the number of 
installations covered in an ETS is needed to represent this situation.  The function is 
required to have the following properties  / 0 B n ∆ ∆ >  and 
2 2 / 0 B n ∆ ∆ <  such that an 
interior net benefit maximisation can be achieved across the range of potential installation 
inclusions.  
 
Aggregate cost of an ETS 
  The difference in cost of compliance between the ETS and the emission standard 







ij TRC TRC C − =   ,          (10) 
where 
ETS
ij C denotes  the  costs  of  administration  and  monitoring,  imposed  on  an 
installation that is covered with an ETS, compared to a standard.  
  At an aggregate level, the total regulatory costs arising from participation in the 
ETS for n installations can be expressed as the sum of individual costs for installations: 








= − ∑ .          (11) 
The optimal coverage of installations in an ETS can then be derived by maximising the 
difference between the  schedule of aggregate benefits (Eq. 8) and those of aggregate 
costs (Eq.9). This corresponds to the level at which net benefits are maximised. To put it 
in terms of marginal value, the optimal coverage will be achieved where the marginal 
benefit  of  adding  another  installation  to  the  ETS,  will  be  just  equal  to  the  marginal 
administration and monitoring costs of adding that installation. Employing equations (8) 
and (10), this can be expressed as: 
ETS ETS





              (12) 
The value for n that satisfies this equality determines the optimal number of installations 
from a given industrial sector to be covered in an ETS. This is graphically represented in 
figures 1 and 2. The level of optimal coverage is given by the point where the marginal 
benefits are equated to the marginal costs. This is also consistent with the point at which 
net benefits are maximised (Figure 2). 
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Data 
  Several sources of data were utilised to conduct an empirical analysis along the 
lines  of  the  conceptual  framework  proposed  above.  Installation-level data  on  verified 
emissions and allowance allocations for 2005  were used for the EU  ETS. Data were 
published  in  the  Community  Independent  Transaction  Log  (CITL).  Data  consisted  of 
observations on allowance allocations and verified emissions for 9,847 installations in 23 
EU member states. The installations were grouped in eight industrial sectors: Cement and 
lime,  Ceramics,  Combustion  (installations  with  installed  capacity  of  more  than  20 
megawatts),  Glass,  Iron  and  steelworks,  Pulp  and  paper,  Refineries,  and  unclassified 
sector of other installations.   
  Data on cost of abating CO2 emissions were very difficult to obtain, due to limited 
amount of information available in the literature, and the confidentiality of abatement 
cost information. Nevertheless, several literature sources were identified where abatement 
cost data were reported. A meta analysis of these data was than put together in an attempt 
to derive an empirical marginal abatement cost function for several industrial sectors. 
This was done for seven of the industrial sectors represented in the EU ETS data: Cement 
and lime, Ceramics, Combustion, Glass, Iron and steelworks, Pulp and paper, and Oil 
refineries.  
Abatement cost data for cement and lime sector 
  In the EU ETS data, the cement and lime sector is represented by 472 installations, 
emitting on aggregate approximately 169.5 million tonnes of CO2 sector wide annually. 
The  manufacture  of  cement  and  lime  represents  a  significant  contribution  to  EU 
emissions  of  CO2  due  to  the  energy  intensity  of  the  manufacturing  process  and  the   12
evolution of CO2 during the chemical transition of the raw materials to cement and lime. 
De Beer et al. (2001), Cembureau (1999) and Anderson and Newell (2003) suggest that 
there is scope to improve the energy efficiency of cement manufacturing, substitute fossil 
fuels with waste products to fire the kilns, modify the composition of the cement by 
reducing clinker content of finished product, and adopt techniques of carbon capture and 
storage. Based on the estimates provided in these literature sources, Appendix table 2 
presents  the  derived  schedule  of  abatement  cost  and  abatement  potential  for  the 
installations in the cement and lime sector.  
Abatement cost data for the ceramics sector 
  In  the  EU  ETS  data,  the  ceramic  sector  is  represented  by  1010  installations, 
emitting on aggregate approximately 13.4 Mt of CO2 annually. De Beer et al. (2001) and 
the  European  Commission  (2006c)  suggest  that  the  scope  for  reductions  of  CO2 
emissions in the ceramics sector are limited to the improvement in the design of kilns and 
dryers, and the enhanced recovery and recycling of heat across the production process. 
Based on the estimates provided in these literature sources, Appendix table 3 presents the 
derived schedule of abatement cost and abatement potential for the installations in the 
ceramics sector.  
Abatement cost data for the combustion sector 
  In the EU ETS data, the combustion sector is represented by 6274 installations, 
emitting on aggregate approximately 1348 Mt of CO2 annually. Hendriks et al. (2001) 
and the European Commission (2006b) suggest that substantial scope exists to reduce 
CO2  emissions    through  the  substitution  of  existing  fuel  sources  with  those  which   13
generate  less  CO2  per  MWh  of  output,  increasing  the  efficiency  of  fuel  conversion, 
employing  renewable  energy  technologies,  and  adopting  carbon  capture  and  storage 
techniques. Based on the estimates provided in these literature sources, Appendix table 4 
presents  the  derived  schedule  of  abatement  cost  and  abatement  potential  for  the 
installations in the combustion sector. 
Abatement cost data for the glass sector 
  In the EU ETS data, the glass sector is represented by 372 installations, emitting 
on  aggregate  approximately  19  Mt  of  CO2  annually.  De  Beer  et  al.  (2001)  and  the 
European Commission (2001c) suggest that opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions are 
limited to reducing energy consumption through improved melting technique and furnace 
design, increasing the percentage of recycled glass used in the production process, and 
increasing the  recovery and recycling of heat across the production process. Based on the 
estimates  provided  in  these  literature  sources,  Appendix  table  5  presents  the  derived 
schedule  of  abatement  cost  and  abatement  potential  for  the  installations  in  the  glass 
sector. 
Abatement cost data for the iron and steel sector 
  In the EU ETS data, the iron and steel sector is represented by 220 installations, 
emitting on aggregate approximately 133 Mt of CO2 annually. De Beer et al. (2001), 
European Commission (2001b) and Anderson and Newell (2003) suggest that there is 
scope to reduce CO2 emissions by substituting coal, oil or biomass for up to 30 percent of 
the coke requirements in the blast furnace, recycling waste heat from the blast furnace to 
other sections of the production process, and by adopting techniques of carbon capture   14
and storage. Based on the estimates provided in these literature sources, Appendix table 6 
presents  the  derived  schedule  of  abatement  cost  and  abatement  potential  for  the 
installations in the iron and steel sector. 
Abatement cost data for the pulp and paper sector 
  In the EU ETS data, the pulp and paper sector is represented by 761 installations, 
emitting in aggregate approximately 29.8 Mt of CO2 annually. De Beer et al. (2001) and 
European  Commission  (2001a)  suggest  that  the  pulp  and  paper  sector  may  approach 
reductions  in  CO2  emissions  through  the  adoption  of  co-generated  heat  and  power 
facilities, energy capture from the emissions optimised incineration and solid waste, and 
by the recovery and recycling of heat throughout the production process. Based on the 
estimates  provided  in  these  literature  sources,  Appendix  table  7  presents  the  derived 
schedule of abatement cost and abatement potential for the installations in the pulp and 
paper sector. 
Abatement cost data for the oil refining sector 
In the EU ETS data, the oil refining sector is represented by 149 installations, emitting in 
aggregate approximately 147 Mt of CO2 annually. Hendriks et al. (2001) suggests that 
reductions  in  CO2  emissions  could  be  achieved  by  adopting  improved  distillation 
techniques  such  as  reflux  overhead  vapour  recompression,  employing  more  efficient 
process catalysts, and the installation of co-generated heat and power facilities. De Beer 
et al. (2001) and Anderson and Newell (2003) suggest that additional CO2 abatement 
approaches may include the capture and recycling of high pressure and heat to other 
stages in the refining process, and the adoption of carbon capture and storage techniques.   15
Based on the estimates provided in these literature sources, Appendix table 8 presents the 
derived schedule of abatement cost and abatement potential for the installations in the oil 
refining sector. 
 
Administration, monitoring and transactions cost  
  The data on the cost of administration, monitoring, transacting in allowances, and 
other regulatory costs, were also very difficult to obtain. Again, some literature sources 
were used to compile a data set of these costs. In an attempt to define administrative and 
monitoring costs Betz (2005) investigates the case of German installations covered in the 
EU ETS, finding that ongoing administration and monitoring costs, before active market 
trading occurs for an average installation amounts to approximately €28,000 per year. 
This is composed of the sum of costs incurred for risk management,  monitoring and 
reporting of emissions and verification costs, and the accounting of allowances in balance 
sheets. Ongoing administration and monitoring costs are assumed to be invariant between 
installations regardless of the volume of emissions or allocation of emission allowances. 
These costs can be viewed from the installations pint of view as fixed costs. In addition to 
these  costs,  Betz  (2005)  notes  that  the  German  government  incurs  ongoing  costs  of 
oversight and regulation of the ETS, which amounts to €7,453,000 per annum for the 
1849  installations  covered,  which  represents  an  average  cost  of  around  €4000  per 
installation, and places the sum of administration, monitoring and government costs for 
an average installation covered in the ETS at €32,000. Betz and Ancev (2006) identify 
that the corresponding installation administration and monitoring costs if covered by an 
emissions  standard  are  estimated  at  approximately  €17,000,  as  they  include  only   16
monitoring, reporting and verification costs. The government incurred costs of oversight 
and regulation are unknown, but are expected to be less on per installation basis than the 
same costs incurred under an ETS (€4000 per installation). Based on these data, in the 
ensuing  empirical  model  it  will  be  assumed  that  the  government  incurred  costs  of 
oversight and regulation are approximately the same regardless of whether the installation 
is covered in the ETS or the standard. Overall, for the purpose of the empirical analysis, 
the 
ETS
ij TRC  (Eq. 4) is set to €28,000 and 
ST
ij TRC  (Eq. 5) is set to €17,000. 
 
Method 
Cost Structure and Functional Form of Abatement 
In choosing a functional form to describe the abatement cost structure of the selected 
industrial sectors there are several desirable properties that need to be satisfied by the 
chosen functional form. Bohringer et al. (2004) suggest that the choice of functional form 
should yield a marginal abatement cost (MAC) of zero at a given baseline (unregulated) 
emission level. Stavins (1995) notes that in the process of reaching an abatement target at 
a minimum cost under an ETS, the MACs should be equated between installations that 
carry  out  positive  levels  of  abatement.  For  this  to  occur  there  is  a  need  for  a  MAC 
function to be convex and increasing in abatement across the full range of abatement. 













, where A is the quantity of abatement (tons of C02, in this case).   17
  Bohringer  and  Loschel  (2003)  identify  several  common  functional  forms  that 
satisfy these basic criteria, including iso-elastic functional form: ( )
β α A MAC = , quadratic 
functional  form: 




















MAC β α  and ( ) ( ) 1 exp − = A MAC β α , where A is the number of units of 
emissions  abated  and  e0  is  the  baseline  emission  level.  The  latter  of  these 
( ( ) ( ) 1 exp − = A MAC β α ) was chosen for the purposes of the empirical analysis. 
  The rationale for this choice of functional form was that it satisfied the desirable 
properties described above, and because it can be easily manipulated to express the total 
abatement cost. In addition, the parameters of the function (α and β) can be meaningfully 
interpreted.  
  The total abatement cost is given by the integration of the MAC expression with 
respect to A, such that the total abatement cost (TAC) for this particular functional form 
can be expressed as: 
  ( ) ( ) A A TAC α β
β
α
− − = 1 exp ,                                                            (13) 
where  the  constant  of  integration  (c)  was  eliminated  by  recognising  that  when  the 
abatement level is zero. 
In addition, abatement (A) can be defined as the difference between the baseline level of 
emissions (e0) and the choice of emissions under regulation (e), which can be expressed: 
  e e A − = 0  
Substituting this expression into MAC and TAC expressions give: 
  ( ) ( ) { } 1 exp 0 − − = e e MAC β α ,                                                          (14)    18
  ( ) ( ) { } ( ) e e e e TAC − − − − = 0 0 1 exp α β
β
α
,                                        (15) 
Generating Abatement Cost Function Estimates 
  To simulate the heterogeneity between installations within a singe sector, it was 
assumed  that  each  of  the  seven  considered  sectors  is  composed  of  four  installations 
representative of the various levels of CO2 emissions. Each of these four installations 
represents a quartile of the recorded CO2 emissions for a given sector. This effectively 
amounts to classifying installations into representative groups of small, medium, large, 
and  very  large  emitters  within  the  industrial  sectors.  The  data  on  quartiles  of  CO2 
emissions for the seven industry sectors from EU ETS are presented in Table 1.  
Given the marginal abatement cost (MAC) functional form specified in equation 
(15)  and  the  installation  specific  baseline  CO2  emissions  values,  it  was  possible  to 
estimate the installation specific values of the parameters of the MAC function, α and β. 
The parameters were estimated using ordinary least squares so that the MAC function 
was  fitted  through  the  abatement  cost  data  (reported  in  Appendix  tables  2-7)  by 
minimising the sum of the squares. This was done by specifying an objective function 
corresponding to the sum of squares, and minimising it by varying the values for the 
parameters (α andβ) for each of the four representative installations in each industrial 
sector. The minimisation algorithm was run using the EXCEL computer software.   
  Because  sectoral  abatement  estimates  were  presented  in  percentages  of  total 
sector  emissions,  it  was  assumed  that  an  individual  installation  can  abate  the  same 
percentage of its own emissions at the same costs as it can be done at a sectoral level. For   19
example, any installation in the oil refining sector can abate 8 % of its CO2 emissions for 
between   € 0 – 10 per tonne, and a further 65 % for between € 190 – 200 per tonne.  
 
Simulating alternative coverage scenarios  
  Once  the  parameters  of  the  marginal  abatement  cost  functions  for  the 
representative  installations  in  the  industrial  sectors  were  obtained,  it  was  possible  to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of each individual installation being covered under an 
ETS, as opposed to the same installation being covered by an emissions standard. This 
was done by invoking the analytical expressions derived in the theory section, with a 
specific  aim  to  identify  the  number  of  installations  n  that  maximises  the  difference 
between the aggregate benefits (Eq. 9) and the aggregate cost (Eq. 11). To determine the 
effect  of  the  stringency  of  a  cap  for  the  tradable  permit  system—which  directly 
corresponds  with  the  stringency  of  an  emissions  standard—four  alternative  aggregate 
CO2 reduction targets were simulated: 10% decrease in aggregate CO2 emissions, 20% 
decrease, 30% decrease, and 40% decrease in aggregate CO2 emissions.  For each of 
these reduction targets, three scenarios were simulated: Scenario 1, where all installations 
were covered by the ETS; Scenario 2, where all installations are covered by an emissions 
standard; and Scenario 3, where the coverage of the installations in each of the sectors by 
an ETS was determined according to the optimality criteria derived above (Eq. 12).  
 
Results 
  The estimates of the parameters of the marginal abatement cost functions for the 
representative installations across sectors are given in Table 2. The parameter estimates   20
for the marginal abatement cost functions by installation and by sector reported in table 2 
suggest that there is some positive correlation between the values for β and the baseline 
emissions values. This is likely attributable to the assumed homogeneity of abatement 
technology  available  to  installations  within  a  given  sector,  which  has  resulted  in  the 
marginal abatement cost being equalised between installations in a given sector when 
they undertake the same level of abatement in percentage terms. This suggests that by 
construction, the installations within a given sector share common marginal abatement 
cost elasticities across their full range of emissions. From equation 15, the elasticity of 
the marginal abatement cost can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) { }
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ε .          (16) 
For a very large emitter, a given percentage reduction in emissions will result in larger 
values of  e e − 0  than for a smaller emitter undertaking the same percentage reduction in 
emissions. In order to maintain the equality in the elasticity of marginal abatement cost 
across installations within a sector, the value of β must be relatively smaller for very large 
emitters than for smaller emitters.  
The estimated values for the α parameter for installations within a given sector are 
very  similar,  reflecting  the  common  possibilities  and  costs  of  abatement  among 
installations of the same sector. This can be attributed to the use of the same abatement 
technology.  However,  the  estimated  values  for  α  vary  significantly  between  sectors, 
which reflects the differences in abatement technologies applicable to individual sectors. 
As α performs a multiplicative role in the MAC function, smaller values of α indicate a 
greater potential for abatement at any given level of marginal cost. In general, higher 
values of α are associated with sectors where relatively little abatement opportunities   21
exist, such as glass or ceramics sectors, while smaller values are associated with those 
sectors which have ample abatement opportunities at their disposal, such as oil refining or 
combustion sectors. This suggests that the parameters α and β indicate some of the salient 
characteristics of inter and intra sectoral abatement possibilities.  
  Results from the three simulated scenarios under the four alternative aggregate 
CO2 reduction targets are reported in Table 3.  There are several observations that can be 
made from these results, which broadly support the theoretical proposition that an optimal 
level of inclusiveness in an emissions trading system is likely to be more cost-effective 
than a blanket coverage of all installations. The first point to note is that at each level of 
aggregate reduction targets, the scenario using the optimality conditions as criteria for 
coverage  of  installations  in  ETS  resulted  in  the  lowest  total  cost  of  achieving  the 
specified  reduction  target.  This  result  emphasises  the  cost-effectiveness  of  the  partial 
coverage of installations in comparison to the blanket coverage. 
  An additional observation is that in the case of the 10% reduction target the total 
cost estimates suggest that a blanket coverage of installations with an emissions standard 
is superior in terms of cost-effectiveness compared to the blanket coverage with an ETS. 
This reflects the small potential gains from trade, in comparison to the additional costs of 
administration, transaction and monitoring that comes with the coverage of installations 
in an ETS. This suggests that if the regulator has insufficient knowledge about the sector 
specific abatement costs, and can only adopt one policy instrument, then at low levels of 
required aggregate abatement, an emissions standard might be more cost-effective than 
an ETS.   22
  Another prominent observation from the results is the relationship between the 
optimal  level  of  coverage  of  installations  with  a  given  policy  instrument,  and  the 
stringency of the aggregate emissions reduction target. In principle, the optimal level of 
coverage of installations by an ETS increases with the increased level of stringency of 
reduction targets. This can be attributed to the differences in aggregate abatement costs 
under an ETS, and under an emissions standard, when the stringency of reduction targets 
is increasing. The implication is that the benefits accruing to each installation covered in 
an ETS—which originate in the difference between abatement costs—increase for all 
installations with ever more stringent reduction targets. As the cost of administration and 
monitoring are static and do not change with the stringency of the target, the growing 
benefits of having an ETS outweighs these costs, and hence the aggregate net benefit 
from including installations in an ETS are quite high.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
  The question of how to design  an emissions trading scheme in  relation to its 
coverage of installations is one of the key design issues that regulators across the world 
will have to address as they set up tradable permit systems for CO2. This paper provides 
conceptual and empirical insights on this issue.  
  From a conceptual perspective, it was important to identify the key elements of 
the criteria for optimal level of coverage of installations in an ETS. Not surprisingly, 
these key elements turn out to be the benefits and the costs, both in total and at the 
margin, that can be attributed to covering installations in an ETS,. The more challenging 
task that this paper undertook was to represent benefits from coverage of installations   23
with  an  ETS  as  the  difference  in  the  cost  of  abatement  under  ETS  and  under  an 
alternative  policy  instrument  designed  to  reduce  GHG  emissions,  in  this  case  an 
emissions  standard.  In  addition,  the  costs  of  implementing  policy  instruments  were 
broken down to cost of abatement, cost of administration, monitoring and compliance, 
and transactions cost. This kind of conceptual representation enabled the derivation of 
optimality conditions for optimal coverage of installations in an ETS, which stated that an 
installation should be covered in an ETS as long as the marginal benefits of doing so 
exceed the marginal  cost. Following this criterion would ensure maximum net social 
benefit from an ETS. 
  The empirical work presented in the paper supported these conceptual findings, 
and showed that blanket coverage of installations in an ETS is inferior to the coverage 
according  to  the  optimality  criteria.  The  empirical  study  conducted  was  rather 
challenging, due to several reasons. One was that the data on allocation allowances and 
emissions for the EU ETS were only available for one year (2005). Data covering longer 
time periods would enable better estimation of abatement quantities in relation to the 
baseline level, and would therefore improve the accuracy of abatement cost estimates. In 
addition, data on cost of reducing CO2 were very limited, and the study had to rely on a 
handful  of  literature  sources  for  the  abatement  quantity  data.  Again,  this  likely 
compromises the accuracy of marginal abatement cost estimates. Further, the challenging 
issue of the choice of functional form for marginal abatement cost function had to be 
dealt with, keeping in mind the desirable properties to be exhibited by the function, its 
tractability and computational limitations imposed by the choice of the functional form, 
as  well  as  the  possibility  for  interpretation  of  the  parameters  of  the  function.  These   24
challenges  and  shortcomings  were  overcome  by  invoking  certain  assumptions. 
Nevertheless, the level at which the assumptions were made ensured that the derived 
results are not driven by those assumptions, but are representative of the real economic 
forces at play.  
  The  results  from  the  empirical  study  confirmed  the  hypothesis  that  blanket 
coverage of installations in an ETS is not likely to be a cost-effective policy. In all but 
one of the simulated scenarios—where the costs were the same— blanket coverage was a 
more costly option compared to the optimal coverage of installations. Dependent on the 
desired  level  of  emission  reduction,  the  optimal  coverage  of  installations  varies.  In 
particular,  for  relatively  small  emission  reduction  targets  (e.g.  10%)  the  difference 
between blanket coverage and optimal coverage was rather notable. For more ambitious 
reduction targets, the costs difference between the two options is diminished.  
  Problematically, the information requirement in identifying the optimal coverage 
level  presents  a  potentially  significant  practical  impediment  to  achieving  a  socially 
optimal outcome. The results of the empirical analysis suggests that there is some scope 
for ‘savings’ to be achieved in applying the optimality criterion, which may provide the 
incentive for investment in the collection of data regarding abatement potentials and costs 
of installations which could be targeted in the establishment of an ETS. 
  Regulators  around  the  world  are  currently  contemplating  the  possibilities  for 
designing  national  emissions  trading  systems,  as  cost-effective  instruments  to  reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. In the process, they are confronted with numerous challenging 
design issues. The coverage of installations in an ETS is one such design issue. While 
blanket coverage that includes most industrial emitters of CO2 in an economy (such as   25
EU ETS) has some intuitive appeal, and seems equitable, it does not take into full account 
the cost and benefits of coverage. This paper shows that an alternative coverage rule 
based on satisfying the criterion of maximising the benefits from inclusion of installations 
in an ETS provides the same emission reduction outcome at lower cost. This implies that 
regulators  should  be  looking  very  carefully  at  given  industrial  sectors  and  should  be 
trying to determine an optimal number of installations to be covered with an ETS. Such 
an  approach  is  going  to  be  less  costly  than  an  approach  where  installations  are 
compulsory covered in an ETS across the board. Since this paper has been focusing on an 
downstream approach only, future work may be including the upstream approach and 
give guidance on the cut-off criteria between downstream or upstream coverage. This 
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Table 1. Representative small, medium, large, and very large installations from each 

















(kt of CO2 
emissions) 
Cement and lime  48.54  218.62  544.79  2864.43 
Ceramics  4.51  9.00  16.94  154.50 
Combustion  4.62  14.85  52.66  10028.47 
Glass  15.24  34.47  72.84  592.75 
Iron and steelworks  25.64  57.06  144.64  11534.47 
Pulp and paper  6.59  18.40  43.22  421.19 
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alpha  beta  alpha  beta  alpha  beta  alpha  beta 
Cement and 
lime  1.0734  0.1476  1.0732  0.0328  1.0732  0.0132  1.0731  0.0025 
Ceramics  5.0357  1.6878  5.0357  0.8462  5.0357  0.4498  5.0357  0.0493 
Combustion  1.4545  1.5430  1.4545  0.4802  1.4545  0.1354  1.4545  0.0006 
Glass  4.6975  0.4277  4.6975  0.1891  4.6975  0.0895  4.6974  0.0110 
Iron and 
steelworks  1.0300  0.2618  1.0300  0.1176  1.0300  0.046  1.0297  0.0006 
Pulp and 
paper  3.9818  0.9449  3.9818  0.3382  3.9818  0.1440  3.9818  0.0148 
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Table 3. Estimated total cost (including cost of abatement and cost of compliance) under 






Scenario 1: All 
covered by 
ETS 
Scenario 2: All 
covered by ST 











10  €2,720,869.36  €2,618,864.54  €2,553,105.47  3  25 
20  €10,795,789.18  €11,608,672.90  €10,712,273.55  14  14 
30  €30,611,610.38  €33,984,258.23  €30,595,837.78  25  3 
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Appendix 
Appendix table 1: Representative installations ranked by baseline emission level 
Installation  Baseline Emissions 
Value (Kt)  Sector 
1  12,497.63  Combustion 
2  11,534.47  Iron and Steel 
3  6,266.75  Oil Refinery 
4  2,864.43  Cement and Lime 
5  1,520.57  Oil Refinery 
6  592.75  Glass 
7  574.11  Oil Refinery 
8  544.79  Cement and Lime 
9  421.19  Pulp and Paper 
10  218.62  Cement and Lime 
11  157.69  Oil Refinery 
12  154.50  Ceramics 
13  144.64  Iron and Steel 
14  72.84  Glass 
15  57.06  Iron and Steel 
16  52.66  Combustion 
17  48.54  Cement and Lime 
18  43.22  Pulp and Paper 
19  34.47  Glass 
20  25.64  Iron and Steel 
21  18.40  Pulp and Paper 
22  16.94  Ceramics 
23  15.24  Glass 
24  14.85  Combustion 
25  9.00  Ceramics 
26  6.59  Pulp and Paper 
27  4.62  Combustion 
28  4.51  Ceramics 
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Appendix table 2: Cement and Lime Sector Marginal Abatement Cost and Scope 






Reducing clinker content of cement, 
wastes and biomass as fuels, heat 
recovery from clinker cooler, application 
of multi-stage pre-heaters and pre-
calciners   
0 – 10  8 
Carbon Capture and Storage  190 - 200  65 





Appendix table 3: Ceramics Sector Marginal Abatement Cost and Scope Estimates 





Improved kilning techniques and furnace 
design, heat recovery and recycling 
0 – 10  15 
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Appendix table 4: Combustion Sector Marginal Abatement Cost and Scope Estimates   





Biomass, Onshore Wind Energy, 
Replacement of coal-fired capacity by 
natural gas-fired Combined Cycle 
0 – 10  31 
Biomass, Hydro electric (>10MW)  10 – 20  6 
Geothermal  50 - 60  0.1 
Offshore Wind Energy  80 - 90  1 
Tidal energy  110 - 120  0.1 
Carbon Capture and Storage  190 - 200  30 
Source: Hendriks et al. (2001); Anderson and Newell (2003); European Commission (2006b) 
 
 






Raising the percentage recycled glass in 
input materials, raw material and 
recycled glass pre-heating, improved 
melting technique and furnace design 
0 – 10  15 
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Appendix table 6: Iron and Steel Sector Marginal Abatement Cost and Scope Estimates   





Coal substituting for Coke up to 30%, 
Application of continuous casting, Scrap 
pre-heating, Oxygen Injection 
0 – 10  7 
Recovery of process gases from blast 
furnaces 
30 - 40  0.75 
Recovery of heat from high temperature 
processes 
130 - 140  0.75 
Carbon Capture and Storage  190 - 200  70 
Source: De Beer et al. (2001); European Commission (2001b); Anderson and Newell (2003) 
 
 
Appendix table 7: Paper and Pulp Sector Marginal Abatement Cost and Scope Estimates 





Heat recovery, improved drying and 
pressing processes, fuel substitution 
0 – 10  20 
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Process improvements i.e.: Reflux 
overhead vapour recompression, power 
recovery, improved catalysts 
0 – 10  18 
Combined Heat and Power generation  60 - 70  7 
Carbon Capture and Storage  90 - 100  60 
Source: De Beer et al. (2001); Hendriks et al. (2001); Anderson and Newell (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 